Chattel Mortgages - Stocks of Goods to be Sold in Trade - Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences by Miller, Vernon X.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 20
Issue 4 June 1936 Article 9
Chattel Mortgages - Stocks of Goods to be Sold in
Trade - Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences
Vernon X. Miller
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Vernon X. Miller, Chattel Mortgages - Stocks of Goods to be Sold in Trade - Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences, 20 Marq. L. Rev. 199
(1936).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol20/iss4/9
RECENT DECISIONS
express agreement, it has been held that an agreement by implication arises and
that delivery on such a side track or platform is sufficient. Soyth and Nortlh
Alabama R. Co. v. Wood, 66 Ala. 167, 41 Am. Rep. 749 (1880). Supporting a
delivery not made at a warehouse, depot, or team track, the reason is given
that such a delivery is the best the carrier can make under the circumstances
and that such delivery is within the contemplation of the parties. Louisville &
N. R. Co. v. Gilimer, 89 Ala. 534, 7 So. 654 (1890). Delivery must also be at a
place where it is suitable and convenient for the consignee to unload before
demurrage charges may be collected. B. & 0. R. Co. v. James Fisher & Son,
5 Ohio S. & C. P. 659, 3 Ohio N. P. 122 (1896). As to delivery by the carrier
upon the consignee's privately owned side track, the courts generally hold that
the carrier has a duty, when the freight is so consigned, to deliver it upon the
private siding before any demurrage charges can be collected. Note (1919) 1
A.L.R. 1425.
ROBERT J. BUER.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-STOCKS OF GooDs TO BE SOLD IN TRADE-FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES.-The debtor was engaged in the retail hard-
ware business. He owed the furnace company $272 on open account for furnaces
and furnace equipment purchased from the company for sale through the hard-
ware shop. Without additional consideration, and at the furnace company's re-
quest, the debtor executed and delivered to the company to secure its open
account a note and a chattel mortgage covering the debtor's stock in trade.
The moitgage was filed within several days. Three months thereafter the
debtor made an assignment for the benefit of creditors. The trustees for the
creditors took possession of the store with all the fixtures, book accounts, and
stock of goods, including the property covered by the chattel mortgage. The
trustees refused to recognize the furnace company's claim for preference.
Thereupon the furnace company took possession of the goods covered by the
mortgage, apparently with the trustees' consent, and the trustees began this action,
described as a replevin action, against the furnace company. The case was tried
by the court. The trial judge found that the proceeds derived from the sale of
goods in the course of business had not been applied on the mortgage debt,
that no replacements to the stock had been made by the debtor, and that the
proceeds had been used by the debtor for his own purposes. The court con-
cluded that the mortgage was void as to creditors and ordered judgment for
the trustees for possession of the goods or in the alternative for the sum of
$600. On appeal, held, judgment reversed and a new trial ordered; until it
could be determined that the mortgagee had originally agreed to the debtor's
unrestricted use of the proceeds of sales, or that the mortgagee had knowingly
permitted such use, the security device was not a fraudulent conveyance.
Wyrmelenberg v. Badger Furrnace Co., (Wis. 1936), 265 N.W. 718.
A chattel mortgage on a stock of goods to be sold in trade is a precarious
security device. The physical security is disposed of by the debtor in the regular
course of business. Replacements to the stock are after acquired chattels and
a mortgagor cannot mortgage that which he does not have. Chynoweth v.
Tenney, 10 Wis. 397 (1860). Such was the common law rule which has been
changed by statute in Wisconsin as it pertains to stocks of goods to be sold in
trade. Wis. STAT. (1935) § 241.14; cf. (1935) 19 MAR(Q. L. REv. 257. The debtor
and creditor must, however, comply literally with the provisions of the statute
or the security device is void. The mortgage is not merely ineffective against
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creditors armed with process or against bona fide purchasers. Nor does it
amount merely to a voidable preference in bankruptcy if the debtor permits
the mortgagee to seize the goods covered by the mortgage. The mortgage is
void in the sense that seizure by the creditor with the debtor's consent is a
fraudulent conveyance and general creditors can reach the goods or the pro-
ceeds therefrom in the hands of the mortgagee. Thomas Produce Co. v. Letman,
184 Wis. 211, 199 N.W. 79 (1924). But filing of the mortgage and strict com-
pliance with the provisions of the statute, particularly those provisions pertain-
ing to the filing of inventories every four months, are not the only factors
which the creditor must consider if he wishes to preserve his secured position.
If the creditor-mortgagee permits the debtor-mortgagor to use the proceeds
derived from the sale of goods covered by the mortgage for other purposes than
paying off the indebtedness or replenishing the stock the security device is void.
Blakeslee v. Rossman, 43 Wis. 116 (1877); Ryan Drug Co. v. Hvainbsahl, 89
Wis. 61, 61 N.W. 299 (1894); The Charles Baumbach Co. v. Hobkirk, 104 Wis.
488, 80 N.W. 437 (1899) ; Durr v. Wildish, 108 Wis. 401, 84 N.W. 437 (1900).
Here, too, the creditor armed with this void mortgage gets less protection than
if he were a general unsecured creditor. His taking possession of the goods
covered by the mortgage with-the consent of the debtor-mortgagor is not merely
a preference, it is in the words of the Wisconsin court a fraudulent conveyance
as a matter of law. The Charles Bawnebach Co. v. Ho'bkirk, supra; Morley-
Murphy Co. v. Jodar, (Wis. 1936), 264 N.W. 926. The preferred creditor must
account to any other attaching creditor, or trustee for creditors generally, even
though the debtor has not been adjudged a bankrupt. Morley-Murphy Co. v.
Jodar, supra. The instant case suggests that the mortgagee-creditor must in fact
have permitted the debtor to use the proceeds as the debtor has wished or the
security device is not void as a matter of law. If the mortgagee is a bank,
and if the debtor is one of the bank's clients doing business in the same com-
munity, and if the debtor keeps his regular commercial account with the
bank, it would seem that the creditor-bank will be deemed to have permitted
unrestricted use unless the debtor has been discharging the indebtedness bit by
bit at regular intervals. See Ross v. State Bank of Trego, 198 Wis. 335, 224
N.W. 114, 73 A.L.R. 225 (1929) and Morley-Murphy Co. v. Jodar, supra. If the
mortgagee-creditor is a wholesaler or a manufacturer who has sold stock at
intervals to the debtor, originally perhaps without security, and is not neces-
sarily as familiar with the debtor's affairs as the latter's banker would be, the
court has indicated in the principal case that permission to sell cannot rest
upon inference alone. There must be some positive showing of fact as to the
original understanding between the parties, or as to knowledge by the cred-
itor of the business practices of the debtor. The burden which the Wis-
consin court has thrust upon the banker-mortgagee is a heavy one. The court
has not indicated what the basis of the accounting between the bank and the
client-mortgagor must be. The cases do not suggest whether the unit account-
ing period must be every day, every week or every month. Nor has the court
even considered how much of the proceeds from the sale of stock the debtor
may set aside to carry business overhead and how much he must pay out to the
secured creditor. Cf. Ross v. State Bank of Trego, supra, and Morley-Murphy
Co. v. Jodar, supra, with the principal case.
VERNON X. MILLER.
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